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In the bicentennial year of 1976, much attention will be focused
within the economics profession upon the eighteenth century climate of
economic thought and circumstance which nurtured the seminal work of the
discipline in 1776, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations . A project appropriate
for such a bicentennial celebration would be to re-examine Smith's analy-
sis cf the English Navigation Acts, the Cromwelllan commercial legis-
lation which served as the keystone of the English mercantilist system.
A study of the Navigation Acts and the analysis of them by the founder
of the free trade school would be useful for broadening the frame of re-
ference within which potential advisers to economic policy makers might
view the present set of international trade relationships. In the ongoing
international crisis of the 1970' s the selfish interests of sovereign
nation-states have been reasserted, in spite of the observation by many
that the nation-state is obsolete in Europe. In the seventeenth century,
which spawned the original Navigation Acts, the idea of sovereign nation-
states in Europe was just becoming a reality.
The two major goals of modern nation-states are security and
welfare, or "defence and opulence" as Adam Smith phrased it. Crucial to
Smith's analysis of the Navigation Acts was the relative importance of
these two goals and the effect of the Navigation Acts upon each goal. Smith's
pronouncements on these questions give rise to confusion, however. At
one point he stated, "As defence, however, is of much more importance than
opulence, the act of navigation Is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial
regulations of England" (p. 431). This quote is cited by those who
*A11 page references to Wealth of Nations are from the Cannan edition,
published by Modern Library } Random House, New York, 1937.
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argue that Smith was, perhaps,, less doctrinaire than his latter day
-'iples.-i- Further on in Wealth of Nations, however, Smith argued with
respect to opulence that the rise of the colony trade was at the expense
trade to Europe. "The causes of ... in other branches of foreign trade...
may all be found in the over-growth of the colony trade" (p. 563). As
regards defense. Smith argued that England ? s naval strength was "equal,
perhaps superior., to the united navies of France and Holland" at the be-
ginning of the Restoration, "But this power could not... be
owing to the act of navigation" (p. 563).
The major task is to determine how the first quote, which implies
that security and welfare are substitutes* can be reconciled with Smith's
analysis of the Acts of Navigation, The bulk of his analysis seems directed
to shewing that "defence and opulence" are complements, not substitutes.
The Acts of Navigation, which he clearly felt hampered the growth of opu-
lence, would therefore inhibit the growth of military power. Finally,
it will be interesting to determine aow the economic and military develop-
ment of England from 1650 to 1776 verifies or falsifies Smith's assessment
of the ts of the Navi,,_. Acts.
will be shown that Adam Smith was consistent in arguing the
complementarity of security and the welfare and that the "defence is of much
more importance than opulence" quote has been completely misinterpreted by
ng taken out of context. It will also be shown that his complementarity
argument was consistent with the historical record of England's rise
-lit was also cited by Herbert Stein, then Chairman of the President's
Council of Economic Advisors, when defending the Administration's goal of
self-sufficiency in energy by 1980. (Public Broadcasting Service television
program, Spring 1974.)

-3-
to economic and naval supremacy In he 18th century.
I. What Others Have Said about Adam Smith and the Navigation Acts.
Adam Smith's phrase "defence, however, is of much more importance
than opulence" is one of the most often quoted from the Wealth of Nations.
It has most frequently been taken to mean that he was in fundamental agree-
ment with the mercantilists of England in spite of the delight he took in
revealing the intrinsic absurdity of specific pieces of legislation.
C. R. Fay calls it, "the famous concession wrung from the author of the
Wealth of Nations" (14, p. 42). Heckscher comments "he showed himself
in profound agreement with measures precisely In the sphere of the policy
of power," and after rendering the quote with appropriate fanfare concludes
"No one could have made it clearer that economic activity ought to be
subordinated to the state's striving for external power" (18, p. 2, p. 16).
1. M. Clark takes it to show that "He recognizes national ends as vital"
(8, p. 67). Jacob Viner used the qiote as an example of the "concessions
he made to the possibilities of the promotion of human welfare through
governmental action." Viner 's interpretation, now enshrined in virtually
every textbook on the history of economic thought, was that when all the
exceptions that Smith made in particular instances to his insistence on a
very limited, role for the state, were put together, he gave the government
a very substantial regulatory and participatory role in the economy (29).
Historians have also focused on this phrase. Charles Wilson has stated
just if ication
that, "until very recently most historians followed Adam Smith's interpretation and A
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of the Acts as primarily if not so strategic in character" (31, p. 183).
Wilson even, claims that Gustav Schmoller, the most famous figure of the
German historical school and unalterably opposed to the teachings of
the laissez-faire school founded by Adam Smith, in his "account of the
central featui t thought and his description of the
apparatus of legislation said enforcement of policy does not differ greatly
from Mam Smith's: it is only that he applauds where Smith condemns"
Lson, p. 185). Eve am Cunningham, the English historian who used man
Schmoiler's ideas in writing his Growth of English Commerce and Industry,
is supposed to put himself in the same, camp with Smith when he states that
some extent plenty is a condition of power and the two policies may
have much in common. 11 The reason Wilson can make all these apparently
incredible statements is the weight he places on the "defence and opulence"
quote. "The famous defence of the Navigation Acts puts Adam Smith back
with the equivocators," (p. 183) i.e., back with Cunningham and most
historians, Including i
1 epitome
of Adam Smith 1 f- ion Act i recent analyst of
Wealth of Nations concludes that it tkely that Smith's approval of
the Navigation ' rely liraite.-- > those, sections only
relating to the British import and coastal trades). And we deduce that
the formally straightforward dictum 'defence is of much more importance
than opulence' was after all maintained subject to a degree of cost, control"
(20, p. 265). An earlier analyst of Smith noted that "an appeal has been
made to the Weal th of Nations in support of a policy called Nationalism
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by its friends and Imperialism by is critics. It has some foundation
in particular texts, but the support will probably be found as slender
as for the Social Revolution, taking text with context and then with the
whole conspectus of the book, we shall hardly arrive at either" (4, p. 47-8).
In view of the overwhelming acceptance of the validity of the quote as
a true representation of Smith's analysis of the Navigation Acts, it is
worth pursuing the lines of investigation suggested by these two dissenting
authors—one using a deductive approach, the other an inductive. Fundaraental
to either approach is a close re-examination of Adain Smith's full remarks
on the subject.
II. What Adam Smith Really Said about the Navigation Acts.
Adam Smith's "wrung concession" Is found in the second chapter of
Book IV in the Wealth of Nations, "Of Systems of Political Economy." In
the first chapter of Book IV, he comments that "Political economy, con-
sidered as a branch of the science of a statesman or legislator, pro-
poses ^o_dJL_s^in^^o^ef:ts^ (italics supplied): first, to provide a
plentiful revenue or subsistence for the people...; and secondly, to supply
the state or commonwealth with a revenue sufficient for the public services.
It proposes to enrich both the people and the sovereign" (p. 397). This
statement, considered in the absence of any foreknowledge of the con-
cession to come in Chapter II, appears to put "defence" in the category
of one of the public services provided out of the public revenue, and to
this extent makes "defence" complementary to "opulence". The order of

importance c£ the two goals, if a c! ice must be made, is apparently
"plenty" first, and "power" second.
This interpretation seems consistent with the discussion of the
public services which follows in Book V of the Wealth of Nations, "Of
the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth" where he discusses in
sequence the expenses of defense, justice, public works and of supporting
the dignity of the sovereign. It also seems consistent with the con-
clusion of Book III, "Of the different Progress of Opulence in different
Nations", where he concludes that "Had human institutions, therefore,
never disturbed the natural course of things, the progressive wealth and
increase of the towns would, in every political society, be consequential,
and in proportion to the improvement and cultivation of the territory or
country" (p. 314). The nature of human institutions, as opposed to the
natural course of things, is rooted not only in man's propensity to "truck,
barter, or exchange" but .' & propensity to domineer. t:The pr
of man makes him love to domineer, and nothing mortifies him so much as
to be obliged to condescend to persuade his inferiors" (p. 365),
The complementarity of power and plenty is then developed in
Chapter I of Book IV in the most extreme case Smith can think of—a large
scale foreign war. "In the midst of the most destructive foreign war"
he explains, "the greater part of manufactures may frequently flourish
greatly; and, on the contrary, they may decline on the return of peace"
413) . The reason for this is merely technical but interesting nor
theless. The nment pay its war exper "seas by pre.-
foreign suppliers foreign bills of exchange which the government b

purchased from English merchants. ish merchants, in order to pay
the foreign correspondent for the bills drawn by them, export commodities
which "when properly sui! aarket, (are) always attended with a
considerable profit" (p. 411), He then draws upon Hume to show the im-
portance of this dev; .nee, to generate an
increase in defense. "Mr. Ri lently takes notice of the inability
of the ancient kings of England to carry on, without interruption, any
foreign war of long duration. The English in those days, have nothing
wherewithal to purchase the pay and provisions of their armies in foreign
countries » but either the rude produce of the soil of which no consider-
able part could be spared from the home consumption, or a few manufactures
of the coarsest kind, of which, as well as of the rude produce, the trans-
portation was too expensive. This inability did not arise from the want
of money but of the finer and more improved manufactures" (p. 413).
Not only the complementarity of power and profit is developed by
Smith In this passage; a power! ison is given why profit should take
precedence over power, The. argument, it is true, is limited to the case
of a foreign war being fought by an island nation but within these limits
(which are applicable to England from 1588 until 1941) it Is supported
forcefully by Smith. The rest of Book IV consists of six chapters des-
cribing in turn six of the major techniques used by "the commercial system"
to "increase the quantity of gold and silver in any country by turning
the balance of trade in its favour" (p. 419). These are two types of
restraints upon Imports (import substitution and dlscr iminatlon against
imports from a particular country) and four types of encouragements to
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exports (drawbacks, bounties, treaties of commerce, and colonies). It is
clearly the intent of Smith to show that these mercantile policies intended
to obtain favorable trade balances and thereby enhance national power
actually tend to retard the development of manufactures and hence detract
from national defer
Book IV is intended to be the "policy implications" of the theoretical
work contained in Books I and II and the historical work in Book III. Book
III, in turn, can be traced in Adam Smith's thought back through an early
draft of Wealth of Nations (published in W. R. Scott's Adam Smith as Student
and Professor ) , to the Glasgow Lectures on Justice, Police , Revenue and Arms
delivered in 1763 (and published by Edwin Cannan in 1896), to a course
"Juris Prudence" he delivered in Edinburgh during his stay there from 1748
to 1751 (24, p, 56), One quote which Scott traced to this Edinburgh
lecture course spells out Smith's original idea on power and plenty: "little
else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from
the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administra-
tion of justice. . .governments which thwart this natural course, which force
things into another channel, or which endeavour to arrest the progress of
society at a particular point are unnatural and to support themselves are
obliged to be oppressive and tyrannical" (24, p. 54, quoting in turn from
Dugald Stewart, Memoir of Adam Smith, Edinburgh, 181.1, p. 100). One may
object that it is invalid to infer what Smith intended in his first edition
of the Wealth of Nations published in 1776 from a fragmentary quote traced
back to 1751. But the fact of the matter is that the Wealth of Nations
had a gestation period fully this long. More to the point for the infamous
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"defence-opulence" quote, Si as seated unequivocally that "wherever the
word 'opulence' oc t we are reading some of Adam
Smith's earliest, work. ;es in which it
been i le of tl 3ions to which
the MS, was subjected ^).
The passage from Chapter I of Boo] quoted in extenso above,
is anticipated in the GI Lectures (p. 209) and. is followed by a pass-
age that most readers should find unequivocal:
It appears that Britain should by all means be made
a free port, that there should be no interruptions of
any kind made to foreign trade, that if it were possible
to defray the expenses of government by any other
method, all duties, customs, and excise should be
abolished, and that free commerce and liberty of
exchange should be allowed with all nations, and for
all things (Glasgow Lectures
,
p. 209).
In spite preambulatory evidence to the contrary, how-
ever, Adam Smith actually did say,, in Chapter 2 of Book IV, "As defence,
however j is of much more importance than opulence, the act of navigation
is, perhaps, the wisest of all the. commercial regulations of England"
(W. of N.
,
p. 431). This chapter, It will be recalled, was concerned with
restraints on particular imports. At the close of the chapter, four
cases are given in which "it will generally be advantageous to lay some
burden upon foreign, for the encouragement of domestic Industry" (p. 429),
The act of navigation is concerned with the first case "when some particular
sort of industry is necessary for the defence of the country." The other
three cases are, In order, when the domestic equivalent of an import has
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an excise tax upon it, retaliatory duties (but only as brief, transitory
measures), and when freedom of trade is restored after a long period of
restriction (due to high transition costs). In the last three exceptions
to freedom of trade which Smith is willing to consider, the bulk of his
exposition is devoted to showing how unimportant they are and the slight
costs to the national welfare which would be incurred by ignoring even
these exceptions, Why does he not make the same kind of argument with
respect to the act of navigation?
One reason could be that he really was an equivocator. Another
could be that he was saving his important argument on this point for the
final chapter of the six dealing with mercantile policies, "Of Colonies".
Since it was going to take an entire chapter which is by far the longest
(and most repetitive) in Book IV to demonstrate the weakness of this par-
ticular policy, Smith dealt with this case first and closed the second
chapter with three exceptions which were easily confuted or belittled in
order to maintain the force of his general argument. Several signals are.
given to the attentive reader, however, to indicate that eventually Smith
would mount an attack even upon the sacrosanct Navigation Acts. One was
his wry statement, "It is not impossible, therefore, that some of the
regulations of this famous act may have proceeded from national animosity"
(p. 431). Smith's feelings about, regulations proceeding from national
animosity are made clear at the beginning of Chapter 3 where he stated, "The
principles which I have been, examining in the foregoing chapter took their
origin from private interest and the spirit of monopoly; those which I am
going to examine In this, from national prejudice and animosity. They are,
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accordingly, as might well be expected, still more unreasonable. They are
so, even upon the pi the commerc (p« 441). Another
signal, possibly more subtle bvj Is his statement before
the equivocal quote Britaii , example, depends
very much upon the number Lors and shi] >g" (p. 431). The object
of the Chapter "Of colonies", however, was to show that the effects of the
Navigation Laws were to mitigate the otherwise favorable effects of the
new discoveries and their settlement upon the number of sailors and shipping
coming from England. Another signal is his emphasis upon the point that the
act of navigation was directed against Holland, "the only naval power which
could endanger the security of England" (p. 431). Later he will state that
and in fact was ,e Dutch fJ hen any more than at
the time he published each edition of the Wealth of Na tions. Finally,
although it is evident this signal was far too subtle for later generations
who could not sustain their attention to eighteem tury prose through
seven, largely redundant, chapters, is the striking ment, in stark
contrast to everything preceeding and following it, that "defence, however,
is of much more importance than opulence."
By refusing to mount a. direct attack upon the Acts of Navigation at
his first introduction of the topic, Adam. Smith was following what he himself
had described as the Socratic form of didactic discourse. "In this method
we keep as far from the main point to be proved as possible, bringing on the
audience by slow and imperceptible degrees to the thing to be proved, and
be gaining their consent to some things whose tendency they cannot discover,
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we force them at last eil what they had before agreed to, or to
grant the validity of the conclusion. .. .If they are prejudiced against the
opinion tc be advanced, we art: not to shock them by rudely affirming what we
are satisfied is disagreeable, but are to conceal our design, and begin-
ning at a distance, bring them slowly on to the main point, and having
gained the more remote ones, we get the nearer ones of consequence. 1 ' (27,
pp. 140-141).
Certainly Smith's audiences in Scotland, which had gained immensely
from the Navigation Acts after the Act of Union with England in 1707, were
prejudiced against any opinion that the Acts of Navigation were not wise and
beneficial legislation. It is also possible that Smith was essaying a form
•of Swift ian ridicule which he greatly admired. "The most common manner in
which he (Swift) throws ridicule on any subject, when he speaks in another
character, is to make them express their admiration and esteem for those
things he would expose. As ridicule proceeds from a combination of the
ideas of admiration and contempt, it is very evident he could not take a more
effectual method to ridicule any foible or sill object than by making some-
one express the highest admiration for it, as the contrast it here the
strongest" (27, p. 45). If this was Smith's intent, and it may well have
been in the context of the original lectures, it was lost upon subsequent
readers for the same reason Smith felt that Swift's serious work was
ignored— it was out of character. But the Acts of Navigation were certainly
appropriate objects of ridicule for Smith, since "the foundation of ridicule
is either when what is in most repects grand, or pretends to be so, has
something mean or little in it " (27, p. 39).
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III. The Logic of Adam ! the Navigation Acts.
The chapters following Chapter 2 each contain hints of the. argument
to be made against the Navigation . Thus Chapter 3
mentions the unreasonableness of regulations motivated by national animosity,
Chapter 4 notes that the ca "certainly deserves no peculiar
encouragement" and that the motive for instituting drawbacks "was, perhaps,
abundantly foolish" (p. 470), Chapter 5 confutes the argument that tonnage
bounties are justified because they contribute to the nation's defense
although not to its opulence, %y ating the number of iti Llors and
shippings, 'i it may i d, may sometimes be done by means of such
bounties at a much sin >ing up a great standing navy,"
(p. 484). This argument, clearly presented as an Aunt Sally, is immediately
followed by ten paragraphs which give detailed evidence to the effect that
the bounties are too ia; am afraid, been too common for vessels
to fit out for the sole the fish, but the bounty"
(p. 486). These ten par as the minor amendments necessary
to "Aunt Sally-tize" the "defence and opulence" paragraph preceeding them,
were only placed in as.
This indicates that inJ make some
concession to "defence" on the Ioj
further researches into the fa the matter persuaded him that even
this concession was not necessary. Even in the f wo editions, however,
the concession was in te t-effactive" technique of providing
a public service and nev hat defense was more important than
opulence. From the third edition on, he concluded his on the tonnage
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bounty by saying, "in the wantonness of great prosperity, when the public
enjoys a greater revenue than it knows well what to do with, to give such
bounties to favourite manufactures, may, perhaps, be as natural, as to incur
any other idle expence. In public, as well as in private expences
,
great
wealth may, perhaps, frequently be admitted as an apology for great folly"
(p. 489).
All of these arguments against the various provisions of mercantile
legislation are mere appetizers for the one to come In Chapter 7 against
the Acts of Navigation. While each facet of the argument is developed at
length and supported in great empirical detail, it is encapsulated in the
following paragraph:
The monopoly of the colony trade, therefore, so far as it
has turned towards that trade a greater proportion of the
capital of Great Britain than what would otherwise have
gone to it, has, in all cases turned it, from a foreign trade
of consumption with a neighbouring, into one with a more distant
country; in many cases, from a direct foreign trade of consumption,
into a roundabout one; and in some cases, from all foreign trade
of consumption, into a carrying trade. It has in all cases,
therefore, turned it, from direction in which it would have
maintained a greater quantity of productive labour, into one,
in which it can maintain a much smaller quantity. By suiting,
besides, to one particular market only, so great a part of the
industry and commerce of Great Britain, it has rendered the whole
state of that industry and commerce more precarious and less
secure, than if their produce had been accommodated to a greater
variety of markets (Wealth of Nat ions, p. 573).
Analyzing this argument takes us into several side issues concerning
the economic analysis of Smith and its consistency. In the first place,
there Is an obvious contradiction here to the assumption of idle capacity in
capital implicitly made by Smith in an earlier articulation of the vent-for-
surplus theory of foreign trade (p. 353). In the formal analysis of the
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Navigation Acts, Smith is clearly arsuming full utilization of capital stock
and focusing upon the re-allocation effects of the Acts. Hollander (Ch. 9)
argues that the latter analysis is consistent with Smith's dominant theory
of foreign trade which explains it by the advantage in efficiency which a
nation gains
.
Another inconsistency is even more troublesome and has never, to my
knowledge, been satisfactorily resolved in analyses of the Wealth of Nations
from Ricardo to Hollander. This is the emphasis upon the capital-labor
ratio, and an expression of approval for employing capital in those sectors
which have the lowest capital-labor ration. This criterion for the allocation
of capital among sectors may, and most likely will, be inconsistent with the
criterion preferred by Ricardo and economists to this day of equalizing
marginal rates of return to capital across sectors. In fact, Smith did argue
later in Chapter 7 of Book IV that "stock" should be allocated among long-
and short-distance trade on the basis of equalizing (with due allowance for
the higher risk of long ce tr ie) the average net profit rates of stock.
But if any of those distant employments, which in ordinary
cases are less advantageous to the country, the profit should
happen to rise somewhat higher than what is sufficient to balance
the natural preference which is given to nearer employments,
this superiority of profit will draw stock from those nearer
employments, till the profits of all return to their proper
level. This superiority of profit, however, is a proof that, in
the actual circumstances of the society, those distant employ-
ments are somewhat understocked in proportion to other employ-
ments
,
and tnat the stock of the society is not distributed in
the properest manner among all the different employments carried
on in it..., Though the same capital never will maintain the
same quantity of productive labour in a distant as in a near
employment, yet a distant employment may be as necessary for the
welfare of the society as a near one (wealth of Nations, p. 593-4).
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It appears, as Hollander ha" argued. Introduces the
criterion of the capital-lab io as a social criterion (generally
used in mercantilist broadsides to give a normative evaluation of any
particular policy mea < to show how the existence of monopoly created a
~rs
of laborers employed per unit of capita 1 Lth's norma-
tive, not his positive, economics ' ej oints out, however, that an
ambivalence remains in Smith's positive, economics* aspect to agri-
culture and manufacturing » Smith argues that there are strong, natural
reasons for stock to be employed first on agriculture. hen more in
industry as the extent of the market and division of labor progress, in these
two sectors, the natural allocation proce& < apital among sectors will,
Smith argues, create the socially optimum allocation of labor, based on the
criterion that, other s equal (sue ag used)
stock should employ workers, the trade sector,
however, Smith has no I s, essentially because he regards
returns to the distributive sec transfer payments only. Therefore, he
does not consider the possibili products Lon existing in the
trade sector which would determine the "natural" capital-labor ratio, and
the "natural" balance or . among sectors
,
given endowments of the factors
of production such as land and labor. Navigable water does not appear to be
considered by Smith as a "natural" endowment of a nation.
But this ambivalency in Smith's treatment of the three major sectors
the private economy does not cons tit 5 onsistency in his argument
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against the mercantilist ies. Indeed, it strengthens the argument since
mercantilist policies wh 11 in fact tend to reduce the opulence and hence
the power of the goals,
(The mercant s and
foreign trade more than agriculture, turns a certain
portion of the al of the society from supporting a
more advantageous, to support a less advantageous species
of industry. But still it really and In the end encourages
that species of industry which it means to promote. Those
agricultural systems, on the contrary, really and in the
end discoui" i own favourite species of industry.
(Wealth of Nations, p, 630).
To summarize, Smith held the following assumptions in his formal
analysis of the Navigation Acts: Capital is fully employed for the economy
as a whole; it is allocated among sectors according to the rate of profit it
can command, allowing for differential risk; there are no fixed factors of
production in the trade sector. These assux ts are,, furthermore, consis-
tent with the theoretical arguments developed in Books I and II of the
Wealth of Nations.
With these assumptions , he then argues that the creation of any
form of monopoly will reduce th e net revenue of the society, hy attracting
too much capital into the monopoly which, has artificially raised the rate of
return on capital in that industry. With respect to the colonial trade of
England, he argues that I vigation Acts created a monopoly for English
shippers, while leavinj 'land's trade with Europe open to competition with
shippers of other nations. The growth of English shipping in the colonial
trade was then greater relative to its growth in the European trade than was
natural. Logically, this meant to Smith that the Navigation Acts would reduce
national income, the base of tax revenue, and hence national power.
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The logic of his case was difficult to prove, however , on two grounds:
one
s the tremendous growth < >g profits primarily from the growth of
the colonial trade which had taken place after the Navigation Acts; and second,
the obvious relationsb ween naval strength and the size of the merchant
fleet, both of which had been growing dramatically since the Navigation Acts.
The first was dealt with by arguing that the beneficial effects of the colonial
trade was so great as to outweigh the bad effects of the monopoly created by
the Navigation Acts
.
We must carefully distinguish between, the effects of the colony
trade and those of the monopoly of that trade. The former
are always and necessarily beneficial; the latter always and
necessarily hurtful. But the former are so beneficial, that the
colony trade, though subject to a monopoly
s and notwithstanding
the hurtful effects of that monopoly, is still upon the whole
beneficial, and greatly beneficial; though a. good deal less so
that it otherwise would be. (Wealth of Nations, p. 573)
The second argument was more difficult to dispose of. Two lines of
attack were taken. One was that naval power depended upon the size of the
merchant fleet and the number of English sailors which could be commandeered
for military purposes in times of war. He tried to show that this relation-
ship between naval power and size of the merchant fleet was not changed by
the Navigation Acts
.
England, it must be observed, was a great trading country,
her mere capit very great and likely to become
still greater and greater every d the
act of navigation had established the monopoly of the colony
trade, but before that trade was very considerable. In the
Dutch war, during the government of Cromwell, her navy was
superior to that of Holland; and in that which broke out in the
beginning of the reign of Charles II, it was at least equal,
perhaps superior, to the United navies of France and Holland.
Its superiority, perhaps, would scarce appear greater in the
present times; at least if the Dutch navy was to bear the same
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proportion to the Dutch commerce now which it did then. But
this great il powe ild not, in either of those wars,
be owing to the act of (Wealth of Nations t p. 363)
Two assumptions are made here which will be examined below; one that the
proportion of naval strength to si ig strength did not change for
Holland from before to after the Navigation Acts; and the second* made only
implicitly, that the ratio of naval strength to shipping strength remained
unchanged for England as well
,
The second line of attack was incorporated into the Wealth o f Nations
in its third edition which appeared at the end of 1784, after the conclusion
of the American War. of Independence. Smith then argued that the maintenance
of the monopoly of colonial trade for purposes of increasing mercantile
profits was injurious to the defense of the nation because the new colonies
did not contribute to che revenue of the government and yet increased greatly
the expense of government by increasing the likelihood of war. The monopoly
increased the need for defex ut reduced the means of supplying defense.
Even accepting the priority of defence over opulence could not justify the
Navigation Acts to Adam Smith.
Beyond this, however, Adam Smith felt I the motivation of the
Navigation Acts was primarily for opulence, no se. "A clause in
the famous act of navigation (keeper proposal into
a law" (p. 530), Further ttainir ry forces in
the colonies was an expense not for the defense of Great Britain but an
expense for maintaining the monopoly of English "shopkeepers." The expense
of the Spanish war o£ 1739 he calls a bounty "given in order to support a
monopoly" (p. 581). He i ides it would have been worth using a bounty,
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a device he abhorred, to avoid the effects of the Spanish war which was
successful in maintaining the monopoly.
Finally, in Chapter 8, added to Book IV with the Additions
and Correction of 1778 which constituted the second edition, Smith concluded
with respect to the costs and benefits of the Navigation Acts that:
For the sake of that little enhancement of price which this
monopoly might afford our producers , the home-consumers have
been burdened with the whole expence of maintaining and defend-
ing that empire. For this purpose, and for this purpose only,
in the two last wars, more than two hundred millions have been
spent, and a new debt of more than a hundred and seventy millions
has been contracted over and above all that had been expended
for the same purpose in former wars. The interest of this debt
alone is not only greater than the whole extraordinary profit,
which, it ever could be pretended, was made by the monppoly of
the colony trade, but than the whole value of that trade, or than
the whole value of the goods, which at an average have been
annually exported to the colonies. (Wealth of Nations, p. 626)
So much for the effects of the famous acts which "may have proceeded from
national animosity" but which were "as wise, however, as if they had all
been dictated by the most deliberate wisdom.' 5
IV. Conclusion
Smith argued that power and profit are complementary goals for a
nation. In this he was consistent with the bulk of mercantilist thought
(30). His only disagreement was that, contrary to mercantilist writers, he
felt the Navigation Acts deprived England to some extent of her possible profit
and hence of her potential power. Even after a century of operation under
the Navigation Acts, England's naval superiority over Holland and France had
not increased relative to those two countries, Smith argued (p. 563). The
argument rests upon some notion of a naval-merchant marine ratio which is
presumed fairly constant over time, for both England and Holland.
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There are a number or ways in which Lo might become operative.
Most simply, the ships of the merchant mar aid provide naval strength in
times of war if they c< inverted to ships of the line. This
had dramatically been the case when England defeated the Spanish Armada with
the vital aid of large, well-armed : nd continued to be true
into the seventeenth By the time of th st act of navigation
>
however, it was unlikely that most large merchant vessels could be used in
time of war, most being built to carry only a few guns for protection from
pirates (2,17). At the end of the seventeenth century „ merchant ships were
of no value to the navy except as supply ships or hospital ships (12, p. 45).
In the half century before the Civil War, the ratio of naval strength to size
of merchant fleet was increasing as English shipwrights concentrated on large
ships for long distance trade where speed and armament were more importan
than cargo space. This was in marked contrast /, which encouraged
the creation of a massive fleet of lightly manned, virtually unarmed, bulk
cargo ships (2). Immediately after the first Navigation Acts, ironically,
this ratio fell considers ne to the ac< of 1,000 to 1,700 Dutch
ships as prizes in the First Dutc. --approxima doubling the size of
the English merchant fleet (12, p. 51).
Another possibility of complementarity, made much of by the Royal Navy
in its pleas for Parliamentary appropriations, was the assurance of customs
revenues from the protection of English shipping afforded by the Navy, whose
existence In turn would be assured if it had sole claim to Customs duties.
Unfortunately for the complementarity argument, the Navy had to contend with
other claimants. Indeed, Customs as a share of the public revenue grew more
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rapidly than Naval expenses as a share of government outlays—war periods
excepted.
A third possibility lies in the pool of skilled seamen trained by
the merchant marine which could be used by the Navy in time of war. Through
that famous institution of doubtful legality—the press gang—the Royal
Navy could avail itself of the entire stock of able-bodied seamen in time
of war. Davis estimates, in fact, that the Royal Navy impressed approximately
three-fourths of the total English sailors available in the League of
Augsburg War with France at the end of the seventeenth century and again
during the Seven Years War in mid-eighteenth century. The total manpower of
the Navy was, from the Acts of Navigation to the Wealth of Nations
,
governed
by the size of the merchant marine and the effective limits of the device
of impressment. It is here that the strongest case can be made for comple-
mentarity of commerce and naval strength, but it rests upon an institution
which should have been abhorred by Smith (although I. can find nothing to this
effect in Smith's writing) and which certainly ran counter to Smith's argument
for a standing military force (28, pp. 653-669).
Nevertheless, the constancy of the Royal Navy's inroads upon the
total pool of English sailors available in times of war throughout the
eighteenth century is strong support for his assertion of the complementarity
of power and plenty. This particular aspect of complementarity may also
account for Smith's preference for short distance over long distance trade
on grounds of social welfare. It was well-recognized that sailors in long
distance trade had a better chance of avoiding the press-gang in times of
war than those in the short distance and coastal trades, simply because their
visits to English ports were less frequent.

?3-
While Smith's case was logically consistent and empirically well-
supported, it cannot be generalized eyond the context of the circumstances
of eighteenth century England, The reason for this is the same one that has
given rise to so much of the confusion surrounding Smith's analysis of foreign
trade—his refusal to postulate a production function in the trading sector.
Without such a production function, which presumably would have had to include
rights to navigable water as an input , he had no need to consider the impli-
cations of the alternatives of mare liberurn or saare clausum for England's
power and prosperity. The full acceptance of mare llberum by Adam Smith and
his contemporary audiences made his arguments for complementarity of profit
and power very convincing for the time. Similar acceptance of the doctrine
of mare liberurn modern era of offshore drilling, deep-sea mining, and
factory fishing operations may well dictate the prrh I power over profit
in the minds of national policy makers today.
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